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NOTES
The Dual Capacity Doctrine in Illinois
INTRODUCTION

The Illinois General Assembly enacted the Workers' Compensation Act to insure the orderly administration of a minimum recovery in every instance of employee injury.' The Act establishes a
system of employer liability without fault and abrogates the employer's common law defenses.' The exclusive remedy provision of
the Act grants immunity to the employer from additional common
law or statutory actions.3 The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act
has generally worked to the benefit of both the employer and the
employee.
Unrestricted application of the exclusive remedy provision may,
however, be neither reasonable nor equitable in employment situations in which the employer assumes a second capacity with respect to its employee's injury.' The dual capacity doctrine is
designed to minimize potential unfairness to the employee. Under
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq. (1979) [hereinafter referred to as the Workers'
Compensation Act]. See notes 8-20 infra and accompanying text.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq. (1979).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1979).
4. McCarty v. City of Marshall, 51 Ill. App. 3d 842, 845, 366 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (4th Dist.
1977) (dissenting opinion).
The Act is not, however, without its problems. Critics have attacked the Act on the
ground of benefits afforded to employees. Some commentators argue that benefits are insubstantial, while others believe that benefit levels are already too high and that Illinois businesses are suffering due to the cost of workers' compensation insurance. Further, some contend that the increase in litigation inhibits the ability of the Act to achieve its purpose of
providing a speedy and inexpensive remedy. See Stevenson, The Illinois Workmen's Compensation System: A Description and Critique, 27 DEPAuL L. REV. 675 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Stevenson].
5. Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual Capacity
Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L. J. 818, 819 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Employer Suability]. See
notes 20-28 infra and accompanying text.
6. See generally, 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 72.80 (1976 &
Supp. 1980) (hereinafter cited as LARSON]. The Illinois courts have also used the phrase
"dual capacity doctrine" to permit a person who is simultaneously an employer and employee to collect workers' compensation benefits. Although an employee may receive work-
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this doctrine, an employer shielded by the exclusive remedy provision may become liable in tort based upon a second capacity which
confers on it legal obligations independent of those imposed on it
as an employer. Despite the apparent simplicity of the application
of dual capacity, the doctrine presents a controversial issue in Illinois. 8 Specifically, the Illinois courts cannot agree on the requirements for finding that a second capacity exists."
This article will discuss the foundations and applications of the
dual capacity doctrine. The case law in Illinois dealing with dual
capacity and the different approaches to its application will be
surveyed. Finally, this article will recommend the most suitable
approach for Illinois.
BACKGROUND

The Workers' Compensation Act
Prior to the enactment of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act in 1911,1" few employees injured during the course of their employment recovered damages against negligent employers. Employers sucessfully relied upon the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant
doctrine." Because of the inequities of the common law system,
the Act was enacted to afford protection to employees by providing
them with prompt and automatic compensation for their work-related injuries. 12 The Act establishes a system of employer liability
ers' compensation benefits, an employer-owner may not. Courts have adopted a dual capacity doctrine to remedy this situation:
Prior decisions of this court have, however, adopted the 'dual capacity' doctrine as
to the corporate executives and clearly establish that one who is a sole stockholder, president and director of a corporation may still be considered in an employer-employee relationship with the corporation if at the time of injury he is
performing the work of an ordinary employee as distinguished from discharging
his executive responsibilities.
Bolnick v. Indus. Comm'n, 81 Ill. 2d 22, 26, 405 N.E.2d 771, 773-74 (1980). See District 141,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Indus. Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 544, 404
N.E.2d 787 (1980); Master Leakfinding Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 67 Ill. 2d 517, 367 N.E.2d
1308 (1977); B.W. Sales Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 35 Ill. 2d 418, 220 N.E.2d 405 (1966).
7. See notes 29-34 infra and accompanying text.
8. Of all the Illinois cases concerning dual capacity, only Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District, 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979), Sharp v. Gallagher, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1128, 419
N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1981), and Marcus v. Green, 13 Ill. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (5th
Dist. 1973) have actually applied the doctrine.
9. See notes 60-97 infra and accompanying text.
10. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138 et seq. (1979).
11. Stevenson, supra note 4, at 675.
12. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 180-81, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1978). One
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without fault that abrogated the familiar common law defenses. 3
The exclusive remedy provision of the Act embodies the basic
principles of the "workmen's compensation compromise," to which
all covered employers and employees have expressly or impliedly
agreed."' Employers compromise their common law rights by foregoing the common law defenses and by compensating employees
for all injuries occurring during the course of employment, irrespective of fault.1 5 Employees sacrifice important attributes of
their common law rights because the exclusive remedy provision
precludes the maintenance of separate tort actions against their
employers.1 6 Employees must also accept compensation fixed by

commentator has noted:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form,
financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an
enlightened community would feel obligated to provide in any case in some less
satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the product.
1 LARSON, supra note 6, § 2.20 at 5.
13. Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac. Ry. Co., 13 Ill. 2d 460, 463, 150
N.E.2d 141, 143 (1958).
14. Employer Suability, supra note 5, at 832. The exclusive remedy provision provides,
in relevant part:
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or
his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer
or the agents or employees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any
employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the
compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the
provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the
legal representatives of his estate, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
for such injury.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1979).
The Workers' Compensation Act also delineates possible recipients of coverage, Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 48, § 138.1(4)(b) (1979), and requires employers to maintain suitable workers' compensation insurance, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.1(3).
15. LARSON, supra note 6, § 65.20. Employers also gain the benefit of relief from the
prospect of large damage verdicts by use of various compensation schedules. Further, the
Workers' Compensation Act establishes the Illinois Industrial Commission. The commission
provides a special forum to handle claims. Claims are governed by provisions relating to
compensable injuries, benefit limits, and appealability of the decisions of arbitrators.
16. LARSON, supra note 6, § 65.20. An exception to this general principle is provided
where the employer commits an intentional tort against his employee. Illinois courts have
refused to extend protection of the exclusive remedy provision where actual intent is alleged
and proved. See Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 233, 388 N.E.2d 265 (4th
Dist. 1979), afl'd 81 Ill. 2d 229, 408 N.E.2d 198 (1980). In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 11. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), the Illinois Supreme Court allowed an action for damages
against an employer, notwithstanding the exclusive remedy provision, where the employer
discharged the employee after the employee filed a workers' compensation claim against the
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statutory schedules17 which exclude normal categories of common
law damages such as pain and suffering and loss of consortium.' 8
Thus, both parties compromise fundamental rights in order to provide and promote an efficient system to compensate all injured
employees.
The Act precludes common law or statutory actions only against
covered employers. Employees may still bring suit for injuries arising out of their employment against third parties. 9 Since third
parties have not agreed to the workers' compensation compromise,
they are subject to the tort actions of employees.
The Illinois Supreme Court has declared that all provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act are remedial and should be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives.20 This
mandate of liberal construction is particularly relevant in determining how the dual capacity doctrine should apply in Illinois.
Difficulties Associated With The Exclusive Remedy Provision
Unrestricted application of the exclusive remedy provision can
lead to situations in which employers may reap benefits not contemplated by the workers' compensation compromise. For example, if an employee of a contractor implicitly agrees that the contractor owes him certain duties within the employment
relationship, the breach of those duties cannot form the basis of a
tort action because of the exclusive remedy provision. 2 ' If the conemployer. For a discussion of the exclusive remedy exceptions, see Note, Dual Capacity
Doctrine: Third Party Liability of Employer-Manufacturerin Products Liability Litigation, 12 INDIANA L. REV. 553, 566-568 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Third Party
Liability].
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8 (1979).
18. Id.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (1979) provides, in relevant part:
Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act was
caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of
some person other than his employer to pay damages, then legal proceedings may
be taken against such other person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer's payment of or liability to pay compensation under this Act.
This section also provides that if an employee recovers damages from a third party, the
employer is entitled to payment of the benefits previously paid to the employee less a pro
rata share of the costs of the third party action. Moreover, the section allows an employer to
initiate a suit on behalf of the employee.
20. Pathfinder Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 563, 343 N.E.2d 913, 917 (1976).
21. The duties owed by a master to a servant include the duty to provide a safe place to
work, the duty to provide safe tools, the duty to warn, the duty to provide a sufficient number of suitable fellow servants, and the duty to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct

of other employees in order to make the work safe. W. PROSSER,
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tractor coincidentally owns the land on which a project is being
undertaken, that employer will have common law and statutory
duties to all workers who come on to the land based on his second
capacity as landowner or supervisor of the construction.2 2 Workers
employed by third parties would be able to maintain tort actions
against the contractor in the event of injury; the contractor's own
employee would be precluded from maintaining the same action
derived from duties violated by the employer-landowner acting in
a capacity outside of the primary employment relationship.2 8 The
employment relationship thus gives the employer a broad range of
protection against normal common law actions, which were not
24
contemplated in the workers' compensation compromise.
Undue benefits may also accrue to an employer when an employee is injured by the use of a product which is manufactured
and sold by the employer.2 5 A worker injured by a defective tool or
machine may generally maintain an action against the manufacturer premised on strict products liability.2 If the employee is injured by a product manufactured by the employer, however, an action would be foreclosed because of the exclusive remedy
27
provision.

§ 80, at 526 (1971).
22. These duties may flow from the common law, as in the case of premises liability, or
statutes such as the Illinois Structural Work Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 et seq. (1979).
The Structural Work Act essentially attempts to protect those exposed to the daily hazards
of construction by requiring that construction be conducted in a "safe, suitable and proper
manner." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60(1) (1979). Violations of these standards will give rise to
an action by an injured person against the person or entity in charge of the construction.
Section 60 of the Act covers a wide class of persons, extending protection to "any person
• . . employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same ..
.
23. See notes 46-67 infra and accompanying text.
24. See generally Employer Suability, supra note 5.
25. For a detailed analysis of employer-manufacturer dual capacity, see Third PartyLiability, supra note 16; Comment, Manufacturer'sLiability As A Dual Capacity of An EmTORTS

ployer, 12

AKRON

L.

REV.

747 (1979).

26. Illinois adopted strict products liability in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). The Illinois Supreme Court stated that a manufacturer will be liable
without regard to fault to users or consumers for unreasonably dangerous and defective
products. Strict products liability promotes the desire to protect the public from unreasonably dangerous products while allowing the manufacturers to spread the costs of this protection throughout the particular industry and society as a whole.
27. See Billy v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980).
An employer also gains more protection than the Act may have contemplated when an
employee of a doctor or hospital is injured while working. If the doctor or hospital treats the
injured worker, the employee cannot sue for negligent treatment because of the exclusive
remedy provision. This result obtains even though the negligence occurred outside of the
employment relationship.
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Thus, an employee could be denied significant protections enjoyed by others merely because he worked for an employer covered
by workers' compensation. An employer who assumes a relationship to an employee in addition to the primary employment relationship thus will often be afforded significant additional protection by the Act, even though these protections were neither
explicitly nor implicitly agreed to by the employee in the
compromise.2
Fundamental Principles of the Dual Capacity Doctrine
In response to the potential abuse of the exclusive remedy provision, courts have utilized the dual capacity doctrine.2 9 The doctrine
recognizes that an employer who is also a landowner, doctor, or
manufacturer may be held liable to his own employee for injuries,
notwithstanding the exclusive remedy provision. 0 The rationale
behind this doctrine suggests that an employer should be held liable when acting in a second capacity that confers obligations independent of those of an employer.31 This principle recognizes complex employment relationships without undermining workers'
compensation.3 2 One basic prerequisite of an action premised on
the dual capacity doctrine is the presence of additional obligations
of an employer to an employee which are distinct from those obligations arising from the employment relationship.33 The dual capacity test does not concern the nature of the second function of
the employer, but rather examines whether the second function
generates obligations unrelated to those of an employer. 4
The courts first recognized the dual capacity doctrine nearly

28.

The problem has been noted in this manner:
The employee, in accepting employment, can be presumed to have accepted all
the conditions of his employment obvious to him and to have implicitly or explicitly agreed to the workmen's compensation compromise. But he cannot be presumed to have waived his right to bring common law actions against negligent
third parties who coincidentally share the role of employer.
Employer Suability, supra note 5, at 832.
29. Third Party Liability, supra note 16, at 554.
30. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.80.
31. Id.
32. Serious questions arise, however, concerning the propriety of requiring an employer
to submit to a common law or statutory action in addition to workers' compensation. This
concern is mitigated by the fact that the employer can utilize the traditional defenses available against a particular claim, thus minimizing any potential unfairness.
33. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.80.
34. Id.
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thirty years ago. 5 The California Supreme Court held that a chiropractor who negligently aggravated his employee's work-related injuries could be held liable for malpractice without regard to liability under California's workers' compensation laws.3 " The court
distinguished the capacity in which the doctor treated his employee from the employment relationship and thus permitted a
third party action against the employer.37 It is significant that the
court based its decision on an examination of the relationship between the parties." It did not concern itself with the issue of
whether the doctor existed as an entity legally separate from the
employer.
The United States Supreme Court has also discussed and endorsed the principles underlying the dual capacity doctrine. In a
case dealing with the exclusive remedy provision of the Longshoremen's Act,3 9 the Court held an employer liable in tort to an employee who was injured while unloading a vessel that the employer
had leased to a third party.40 The Court emphasized that it would
be unjust to preclude recovery because employees of third parties
who work on the same vessel would be entitled to recovery against
the lessor of the ship for a similar injury."
Despite the progressive nature of the doctrine, most jurisdictions
encountered difficulties in creating the dual capacity exception to

35. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
36. Id. at 796, 249 P.2d at 15. The California Workers' Compensation Act, nearly identical to that of Illinois, provides for exclusive remedy and third party actions. See CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 3601, 3852 (West 1971).
37. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 793, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (1952).
38. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 13.
39. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963). See Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1970) (amended 1972) [hereinafter referred to as the
Longshoremen's Act]. The Longshoremen's Act closely resembles workers' compensation
acts of Illinois and other states with respect to the employer's liability for compensation
being "exclusive and in place of all other liability" to the injured longshoreman. 33 U.S.C. §
905(a) (1970) (amended 1972). The Act also provides for third party actions. See 33 U.S.C. §
933 (1970) (amended 1972). See generally Note, The Vessel As Employer Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act - The Yaka
Lives On, 23 Loy. L. REv. 571 (1977) for a thorough discussion of suits by injured employees
against employers who are also shipowners.
40. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1963).
41. Id. at 415. Since The Yaka, several courts have held that an employer-shipowner
could be liable for injuries to its own employees irrespective of the exclusive remedy provision, based upon the rationale enunciated therein. That is, employees should not be denied
common law recovery merely because their employers coincidentally own the ship. See
Smith v. M/N Captain Fred, 546 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1977); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
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exclusive remedy provisions. A sampling of the approaches utilized
in other jurisdictions discloses that only a minority of states accept
and apply dual capacity.4 Those courts which reject dual capacity
do so on the basis of perceived inconsistencies with the exclusive
remedy provisions,' avoidance of judicial legislation, 4 or lack of

42. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text. Only California, Illinois, and Ohio
have unequivocally acknowledged and applied the dual capacity doctrine.
Michigan courts have also applied what is essentially the dual capacity doctrine. In Panagos v. North Detroit Gen. Hosp., 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542 (1971), a hospital
employee was injured when she cut her mouth on a foreign particle in a piece of pie purchased in the hospital's cafeteria. Id. at 555, 192 N.W.2d at 542. Without specifically mentioning the dual capacity doctrine, the court allowed the plaintiff to bring a tort action
separate from the workers' compensation remedy.
Plaintiff's present case is based upon the vendor-vendee relationship. The whole
theory of the cause of action has nothing to do with the fact that plaintiff also
happened to be employed by the defendant. We see no need for plaintiff to first
seek relief from the Workmen's Compensation Department when it is clear that
the employee-employer relationship is unrelated to the cause of action.
Id. at 559, 192 N.W.2d at 544.
The test expressed in Panagos examines the nature of the second function of the employer. Actually, the dual capacity doctrine is not concerned with the precise legal nature of
the second function of the employer, but rather whether that second function generates
obligations unrelated to those flowing from the capacity of employer. See note 34 supra and
accompanying text. Other Michigan cases utilizing the same test include Robards v. Estate
of Kantzler, 98 Mich. App. 414, 296 N.W.2d 265 (1980); Neal v. Roura Iron Works, Inc., 66
Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837 (1975).
43. Courts in several jurisdictions have refused to accept the validity of the dual capacity doctrine because of the sanctity of the statutory language of exclusive remedy provisions.
E.g., State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979) (suit against state employer for defective
maintenance of highways); Billy v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 432 N.Y.S.2d
879 (1980) (employer-manufacturer); McAlister v. Methodist Hosp. of Memphis, 550 S.W.2d
240 (Tenn. 1977) (suit against hospital by employee for negligent treatment of work-related
injuries); Cohn v. Spinks Indus. Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (suit against
employer-lessor of defective helicopter). These courts generally note the strict language in
the respective exclusive remedy provisions. In addition, these courts find dual capacity inconsistent with the salutary purposes of the workers' compensation schemes. See Lewis v.
Gardner Eng'r Corp., 254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778 (1973).
44. Courts in four states have declined to adopt dual capacity by judicial decision. See
Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 171 Ind. App. 671, 359 N.E.2d 544 (1977) (case involving employer-manufacturer of pressure cooker); Herbert v. Gulf States Util. Co., 369
So.2d 1104 (La. App. 1979) (suit against utility company-landowner for electrical burns);
Longiver v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1783, 408 N.E.2d 857 (1980)
(suit against employer-landowner for negligence); Trotter v. Litton Sys. Inc., 370 So.2d 244
(Miss. 1979) (suit for employer's aggravations of work-related injuries). Citing the strict language of the exclusive remedy provisions, these courts have ruled that the decision to adopt
dual capacity rests with the legislature. In Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 171 Ind.
App. 671, 674, 359 N.E.2d 544, 545 (1977), the court remarked, "The clear and unambiguous
language of the Act precludes our adoption of the dual capacity doctrine ..
" The court
continued, "If a change in the law is to be made in this respect, such change must be by Act,
or at least authorization of the General Assembly."

Dual Capacity Doctrine
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appropriate factual settings.4"
THE

DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS

History
Illinois courts first recognized and applied the dual capacity doctrine in Marcus v. Green."' The plaintiff was employed by a sole
proprietorship. 47 The individual employer was also a member of a
partnership that owned the land on which the plaintiff worked.'8
The employer thus simultaneously occupied two capacities with respect to his employee: a partnership and a sole proprietorship.
While working on the partnership's property, the plaintiff-employee incurred injuries.4'9 The employee accepted workers' compensation benefits provided by the employer, and then brought an
action against the partnership as owner of the land and supervisor
of construction.5 0 Because the employer had paid the workers'
compensation benefits, the partnership contended that the exclusive remedy provision immunized it from suit by virtue of the em51
ployer's membership in the partnership.
The Fifth District of the Illinois Appellate Court refused to apply the exclusive remedy provision to bar the plaintiff's action. Instead, the court applied the dual capacity doctrine to support an
action against the partnership. 2 The court found that the em45. Courts in at least five states have implied that the dual capacity doctrine may be
viable in their jurisdictions, but the fact situations in the cases presented were not amenable
to its application. See, e.g., Stone v. U.S. Steel Corp., 384 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1980) (suit alleging
dual capacity based on separate divisions of a corporate employer); Adair v. Moretti-Harrah
Marble Co., 381 So. 2d 181 (Ala. 1980) (suit for negligence in safety inspections by a selfinsured employer); Mapson v. Montgomery White Trucks, Inc., 357 So. 2d 971 (Ala. 1978)
(case in which an employee was injured during employment and no independent obligations
to the employee existed); Wright v. Moore, 380 S.W.2d 172 (La. App. 1979) (suit against
state employer for malfunction of railroad crossing signal); Latendresse v. Preskey, 290
N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 1980); Parker v. Williams and Madjanik, - S.C.
.,267 S.E.2d 524
(1980) (wrongful death action against landowner by employee of separate subcontractor).
These cases express a high degree of understanding of the fundamental issue of distinct
obligations to the employee and demonstrate a willingness to apply the doctrine in appropriate fact situations.
46. 13 Ill. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (5th Dist. 1973).
47. Id. at 701, 300 N.E.2d at 514.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 701, 300 N.E.2d at 513.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 702, 300 N.E.2d at 515.
52. Id. at 707-08, 300 N.E.2d at 517-18. The court thus allowed a claim against the employer, as a landowner in charge of construction, for violation of the Illinois Structural Work
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 et seq. (1979).
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ployer possessed two sets of legal duties to its employee: one arising out of the employment relationship and one resulting from the

partnership activity.53 The Fifth District concluded that while an
action against the employer as such was precluded, an action
against the employer acting in the capacity of a landowner was

permissible." In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the
employment relationship without regard to the legal organizational
structure of the employer.5 5 It, of course, considered the result as
consistent with the remedial purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Despite this reasoning and authority, Illinois appellate court decisions after Marcus declined to apply the dual capacity doctrine.
The courts denied third-party actions against employers acting as
landowners or manufacturers, and held that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy." These courts found persuasive the
Marcus court's subsequent retreat from its statement of the doctrine. 7 In a later case,58 the Fifth District stated that it did not
read its earlier opinion as a broad repeal of employer immunity."
The court distinguished Marcus on the ground that the employer

53. Id. at 708-09, 300 N.E.2d at 519. The court stated that the Structural Work Act was
designed to provide a remedy for personal injuries and property damage sustained by particular employees. The court concluded that the duty imposed by the Structural Work Act
on an owner in charge of the work was entirely separate from the duty of an employer. Id. at
707-08, 300 N.E.2d at 517.
54. Id. at 707-08, 300 N.E.2d at 518.
55. Id.
56. Employer-landowner situations presented several cases for review. In Walker v.
Berkshire Foods, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 595, 354 N.E.2d 626 (1st Dist. 1976), a packing house
maintenance man was injured while washing windows at his place of employment. The court
noted the existence of the defendant as a single entity and thus applied the exclusive remedy provision. Id. at 598, 354 N.E.2d at 629. In Carey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago,
48 Ill. App. 3d 482, 484, 363 N.E.2d 400, 401-02 (2d Dist. 1977), the Second District refused
to consider the existence of dual capacity where the employee was injured while working at
his usual place in a building owned by his employer. The Fourth District also declined to
apply the dual capacity doctrine in McCarty v. City of Marshall, 51 111. App. 3d 842, 366
N.E.2d 1052 (4th Dist. 1977), where an employee of the defendant city was injured while
performing maintenance duties at the city power plant.
57. See Carey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 48 IlM.App. 3d 482, 484, 363 N.E.2d
400, 401 (2d Dist. 1977), where the court noted that "the holding in [Marcus v. Green) has
been substantially rejected, not only by the Fifth District itself, but by the other appellate
courts of this State."
58. Dintelman v. Granite City Steel Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 509, 341 N.E.2d 425 (5th Dist.
1976) (employee injured when he fell from a scaffold while working on a structure owned by
the employer).
59. Id. at 512, 341 N.E.2d at 427.
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in the later case was not a common party in two legal entities. 0
Often without any substantial analysis of the particular facts,

Illinois appellate courts cited the Fifth District's reappraisal of
Marcus in support of their refusal to recognize the dual capacity
doctrine.6 1 An example of the counteraction against dual capacity
is Kim v. Raymond,"' a case involving facts strikingly similar to
Marcus. Although the defendant in Kim was arguably acting both

as an individual and a corporate employer, the court distinguished
Marcus, holding that the common law defendant and the employer
were the same entity. 6" And even assuming that separate legal entities existed, the Kim court found little precedential value in
Marcus."
Illinois courts also found dual capacity inapplicable to cases involving the liability of employer-manufacturers. Several courts
noted the limitations imposed by the Fifth District on the Marcus
holding,"5 and specified the separation of legal entities as a basis
for their rulings." In their analyses, however, the courts examined
whether the particular item that caused the injury was merely a
tool furnished to employees, or whether it was a product sold to
the public and coincidentally used by an employee. Thus, unlike

60. Id.
61. See note 56, supra. It must be noted, however, that application of the dual capacity
doctrine in the employer-landowner cases probably would not have changed the results. In
those cases, the employees worked on their employer's land, not as a matter of circumstance, but as a matter of necessity in the employment relationship. Thus, claims for violations of the Structural Work Act did not rely upon any truly distinct obligations arising
from a second capacity.
62. 44 Ill.
App. 3d 37, 358 N.E.2d 34 (1st Dist. 1976) (employee injured while laying
shingles on the roof of a structure owned by his employer).
63. Id. at 38, 358 N.E.2d at 35.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Profilet v. Falconite, 56 Ill. App. 3d 168, 371 N.E.2d 1069 (1st Dist. 1977),
where a laborer was injured when a crane leased by his employer to a third party came in
contact with overhead electrical wires. Id. at 169, 371 N.E.2d at 1070. The court held that
the defendant-employer existed as only one entity, thus making dual capacity inapplicable
due to the limitations on the Marcus holding. Id. at 171-72, 371 N.E.2d at 1072.
66. See Sago v. Amax Aluminum Mill Prods. Inc., 67 Il.App. 3d 270, 385 N.E.2d 17 (1st
Dist. 1978), where an employee was injured by a machine that had been manufactured by a
division of the corporate defendant. Id. at 272, 385 N.E.2d at 17-18. At the time of the
injury, the division had been sold and was an independent corporation. Id. Noting that at
the time of the sale the defendant did not participate in two different entities, the court
declined to apply the dual capacity doctrine. Id. at 275, 385 N.E.2d at.19-20.,
67. See Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 I1. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1st
Dist. 1976). The plaintiff was injured while operating a punch press manufactured by a third
party. The employee alleged that the defendant occupied a second capacity as a quasi-manufacturer by removing the machine's safety devices, thereby causing the plaintiff's injuries.
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the employer-landowner cases, the employer-manufacturer cases
attempted to analyze the employment relationship at issue.
The appellate court cases prior to 1979 adopted a strict position
on the enforcement of the exclusive remedy provision. The courts
thereby avoided difficult questions of potentially conflicting policies involving equity and statutory language.8 The confusion
throughout the state as to the existence and application of dual
capacity necessitated guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court or
the Illinois General Assembly."
The Illinois Supreme Court's Reaction
In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issues of the
existence and application of the dual capacity doctrine in Smith v.
70
Metropolitan Sanitary District.
The plaintiff was employed by a
joint venture composed of S.J. Groves & Sons Company and W.E.
O'Neil Construction Company. 1 Pursuant to the joint venture
agreement, O'Neil leased a truck to the venture. 7 2 The truck malfunctioned and struck the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff commenced a
strict products liability action against defendant O'Neil for leasing
the allegedly defective truck to the joint venture.7 4 The court re-

Id. at 788, 354 N.E.2d at 555. The court recognized dual capacity in its analysis, noting:
The defendant does not sell punch presses. It only provides them for employees.
This is an incident of the employment relationship. Further, even under the dual
capacity doctrine, the second capacity must be one that creates legal obligations
on the part of the employer to the public in general and not just to its employees.
Id. at 789-790, 354 N.E.2d at 556. The dissent, in turn, noted:
The Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted long before the Suvada doctrine
was generally recognized by the law. I therefore find no justification for imputing
to the legislature an intent to adopt a workmen's compensation scheme which permits an employer to withhold from his employee the protections the Suvada doctrine requires a manufacturer to provide.
Id. at 797, 354 N.E.2d at 561 (Simon, J., dissenting).
68. See note 81-97 infra and accompanying text.
69. In Dintelman v. Granite City Steel Co., 35 Mll. App. 3d 509, 514, 341 N.E.2d 425, 428
(5th Dist. 1976), the appellate court stated that it would not hold the employer liable for
violation of the Illinois Structural Work Act "in the absence of further direction from the
legislature or our Supreme Court." In Sago v. Amax Aluminum Mill Prods., Inc., 67 I1.App.
3d 270, 275, 385 N.E.2d 17, 20 n.1 (1st Dist. 1978), the court stated: "Whether inequities
have resulted is a question with which the legislature must deal."
70. 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979).
71. Id. at 316, 396 N.E.2d at 526.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court denied claims against O'Neil for negligence and violations of the Structural Work Act because, like a partner in a partnership, the duties of a joint venturer are
coextensive with those of the joint venture. Id. at 318, 396 N.E.2d at 527.
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jected O'Neil's claim that its membership in the joint venture conferred immunity pursuant to the workers' compensation exclusive
remedy provision.7 5 Applying the dual capacity doctrine, the court
held that the employer occupied a second capacity which conferred
obligations separate and independent from the capacity of employer.7 6 The court stated, however, that the employer must exist
as a separate legal persona in order for such independent obliga77
tions to be present.
Characterizing the allegedly defective truck as equipment leased
to the joint venture, not as a tool furnished by the defendant as a
member of the joint venture, the court applied the dual capacity
doctrine to sustain the cause of action.78 The court reasoned that
the plaintiff's right to bring the action should not depend on
whether the truck was leased from one of the joint venturers or
from a third party.79 The court concluded that O'Neil's coincidental status as a member of the joint venture should not determine
its liability. 80

75. Id. at 318-20, 396 N.E.2d at 527-28.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 319, 396 N.E.2d at 527.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 320, 396 N.E.2d at 528.
80. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court expressed a similar rationale in Laffoon v. Bell &
Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill. 2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976), in which a general contractor paid
workers' compensation benefits for an injured employee of an uninsured subcontractor. Id.
at 441, 359 N.E.2d at 127. The employee attempted to maintain an action against the general contractor under the Illinois Structural Work Act. Id. The court allowed the action
despite the fact that the defendant had paid workers' compensation benefits to the employee. Id. at 447, 359 N.E.2d at 130. Noting that an unfair classification might arise between employees of insured versus uninsured employers, the court reasoned:
The sole basis for this differentiation is the fortuitous circumstance of whether the
workman's employer carries compensation insurance. Moreover, the classification
of general contractors in regard to their liability as third-party tortfeasors is
equally arbitrary, for it, too, is based upon the fortuitous circumstance of whether
the particular subcontractor provides compensation coverage.
Id. at 446, 359 N.E.2d at 129.
Following the Smith decision, Illinois courts decided three dual capacity cases. In McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 82 Il1. App. 3d 77, 402 N.E.2d 412 (4th Dist. 1980), rev'd 85
Ill.2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Appellate
Court's application of the dual capacity doctrine. Plaintiff was injured during the course of
his employment at the Caterpillar Tractor Company 82 Ill. App. 3d at 78, 402 N.E.2d at
413. Physicians, employed on a full-time basis by the defendant employer, negligently aggravated plaintiff's injury. 82 Ill. App. 3d at 78, 402 N.E.2d at 413. The Fourth District of
the Illinois Appellate Court found the employer liable for the negligence of its doctors because it assumed a second capacity in furnishing medical services to its employee. 82 InI.
App. 3d at 78-80, 402 N.E.2d at 414-415.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's finding and held that the provi-
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The Impact of Smith
The Illinois Supreme Court may have finally settled the uncertainty about the existence of the dual capacity doctrine in Illinois.
Where the employer is a common part in two separate legal entities which have distinct obligations to the employee, the employee
can apparently maintain a cause of action against the employer for
breach of those duties not contemplated within the primary employment relationship. 81 The employer's presence in two entities
places it in a third party relationship to its employee. In its capacity outside the primary employment relationship, the employer
does not enjoy the protections of the exclusive remedy provision.8 '
Smith essentially utilized dual capacity to prohibit an employer
who acted in two capacities from escaping liability by hiding behind the employment relationship.
The Smith decision, however, does not conclusively answer the
question of how dual capacity claims should be evaluated where
sion of medical care to the employee was within the scope of the employer-employee relationship. This holding was based on the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act's requirement
that an employer "'provide and pay for all the necessary first aid, medical and surgical
services, and all necessary medical and hospital services thereafter incurred, limited, however, to that which is reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the accidental
injury.' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a).)" 85 Ill.2d at 358, 423 N.E.2d at 878. The
actions of the doctors did not give rise to a separate doctor-patient relationship; therefore
no duty arising outside of the workers' compensation compromise was breached.
In Sharp v. Gallagher, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1128, 419 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1981), plaintiff was
injured while working on land owned by his employer, a contractor. 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1130,
419 N.E.2d at 445. Plaintiff sued the contractor for violations for the Structural Work Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, 60 1977. 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1134, 419 N.E.2d at 449.
The First District of the Illinois Appellate Court applied the dual capacity doctrine in
reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action. 94 11. App. 3d at 1135, 419 N.E.2d at 449.
The court found the facts in the case to be indistinguishable from those in Marcus v. Green,
13 Ill. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (5th Dist. 1973) noting that the contractor had separate
obligations to the plaintiff in its different capacities of employer and landowner. 94 Ill. App.
3d at 1135, 419 N.E.2d at 449. See notes 46-55 supra and accompanying text. Significantly,
the defendant's existence as only one legal entity did not preclude application of the doctrine. 94 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 419 N.E.2d at 446.
In Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machs., Inc., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 403 N.E.2d 555 (1st Dist.
1980), the First District refused to apply dual capacity against the employer-manufacturer
because the machine that injured the plaintiff was merely a tool furnished by the employer.
In Goetz, the employee was injured by a defective machine manufactured by one of the
defendant's employees for exclusive use in the factory. Id. at 1056, 403 N.E.2d at 558. Because the machine was a tool for the exclusive use of the defendant's employees, the manufacture of the machine did not create any obligations to the plainftifftiMhich were distinct or
independent from those generated by the employment relationship. Id. at 1062, 403 N.E.2d
at 562.
81. Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979).
82. Id. at 319, 396 N.E.2d at 527-28.
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only one legal entity is involved." The Smith court suggested that
simply a separate theory of liability against the same legal person
of the employer would not properly invoke the dual capacity doctrine. Rather, application of the doctrine requires a "distinct separate legal persona."' Whether the presence of separate legal entities should solely and conclusively establish the existence of
seperate legal persona or whether the court should undertake an
analysis of obligations in a particular employment relationship undertaken regardless of the particular business forms of the employer remains uncertain.
In determining the present application of dual capacity in Illinois an understanding of the meaning of "separate legal persona"
is critical."5 A widely accepted definition of the term "legal per-

83. This question is important in helping to stabilize Illinois law with respect to the
cases that discredited or limited Marcus to its facts.
84. Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 77 Ill. 2d 313, 319, 396 N.E.2d 524, 527 (1979).
The inapplicability of dual capacity to mere separate theories of liability against the same
legal capacity of the employer is grounded in traditional workers' compensation law. Illinois
courts have always held that the Workers' Compensation Act provides the basic liability of
employers and that recovery on separate bases of liability is precluded. See generally Faber
v. Indus. Comm'n, 352 II. 115, 185 N.E. 255 (1933); Vacos v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co., 21
Ill. App. 2d 569, 159 N.E.2d 24 (1st Dist. 1959). If an employer has only one capacity or a
single set of obligations to its employee, the employee cannot file suit based on additional
statutory or common law theories that arise in addition to the employment relationship. See
note 76 supra and accompanying text. The Illinois Supreme Court had previously expressed
this principle when it discussed the relationship between the Structural Work Act and the
Workers' Compensation Act. See Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac. Ry. Co.,
13 Ill. 2d 460, 463, 150 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1958) (court refused to allow an action by a bricklayer who fell from a scaffold against an employer based on the Structural Work Act). The
court stated that "[t]o the extent that it prohibits an action by an employee against an
employer, the Workmen's Compensation Act has amended the Illinois Structural Work
Act." Id. at 463, 150 N.E.2d at 143.
85. The term "separate legal persona" was first used by Professor Larson in a supplement to his treatise. See LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.80. The Smith court quoted language
used by Professor Larson in his discussion of Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App.
3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977), and Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361
N.E.2d 492 (1977). These cases applied the dual capacity doctrine against employer-manufacturers who existed as only one legal entity. Professor Larson disapproved of the holdings
in these cases, stating:
This case [Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc.] and the preceding California case of Douglas
are unsound applications of the dual-capacity concept. They overlobk the simple
fact that the use of the product was a routine and integral part of the employment. Dual capacity requires more than a separate theory of liability of the same
legal person.
LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.80.
This commentary might be read to require that the employer exist in two separate legal
entities in order to properly apply the dual capacity doctrine. Rejection of the approach that
exclusively examines the issues of the varying obligations to the employee appears to affirm
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sona," is not, however, readily ascertainable.8 6 A persona may be
described as a person or entity which possesses a bundle of rights
and obligations.8 7 Under this definition, an employer might owe
different legal obligations to the same employee, depending upon
which persona or capacity the employer occupies at any particular
moment.
Although the term legal persona has not been expressly mentioned, the underlying principles of its definition suggested above
have been applied by the California and Ohio courts. 88 These
courts analyze the particular employment relationship and determine whether the employer breached duties owed exclusively to
the employee as an employee, or to the employee as a member of
the general public. Both jurisdictions hold that a manufactureremployer owes the same duty to their employees who use their
products in the course of their employment as that owed to the
public."'

the approach that examines the separation of legal entities as the test of the existence of
dual capacity.
86. Neither Professor Larson nor the cases applying the separate legal persona test define the concept, except by way of case situations. Marcus v. Green, 13 Ill. App. 3d 699, 300
N.E.2d 512 (5th Dist. 1973) and the United States Supreme Court case of Reed v. The
Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) are cited as examples of the existence of separate legal persona.
But in Reed the employer existed as only one legal entity. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
87. Black's Law Dictionary, 1029 (5th ed. 1979) defines persona as a "character in virtue
of which certain rights belong to a man and certain duties are imposed upon him. Thus, one
man may unite many characters . . .as, for example, the characters of father and son, of
master and servant."
88. See Bell v. Indus. Vangas, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 3d 463, 168 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1980);
Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1980); Dorado v.
Knudsen Corp., 103 Cal. App. 3d 605, 163 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977); Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55
Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978); Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361
N.E.2d 492 (1976).
89. In Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 803
(1977), the court applied the dual capacity doctrine despite the presence of only one legal
entity. The employee was injured while working on a scaffold manufactured by the defendant for sale to the public. Id. at 106, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 798. The court reasoned that the
employer, by manufacturing a product for sale to the public, assumed all the duties and
liabilities of a manufacturer with respect to its employee. Id. at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
In Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976), a truck driver
employed by the defendant pursuant to an agreement with a stevedoring company was injured when a tire manufactured by the defendant blew out. The court allowed the maintenance of the action because of the existence of obligations to the employee as a member of
the public that were unrelated to the defendant's obligations as an employer. Id. at 285, 361
N.E.2d at 496.
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The Separate Legal Entities Requirement

Despite the persuasiveness of the independent obligations approach, the separate legal entities requirement of the dual capacity
doctrine has significant legal support.9 0 In both Smith and Marcus
v. Green, the employer took part in two separate legal entities.9 1
Some observers contend that if an injury occurs during employment by a single entity, an employee should not be allowed to circumvent the exclusive remedy provision by recovering damages in
excess of workers' compensation." The Seventh Circuit has held
duties owed to an employee of a single entity to be unseverable.9e
Coincidence in duties by itself may not sufficiently justify avoiding
the exclusive remedy provision." Additional common law or statutory damage actions should therefore be barred even if the employer owes the public a general duty as a manufacturer or a
landowner."
Further, serious practical difficulties might exist in attempting to
separate the duties of an employer owed to his employee from
those owed to the public." In refusing to apply the dual capacity
doctrine to a single entity employer-manufacturer situation, the
New York Court of Appeals reasoned that any duties owed to an
employee merely constitute subcategories within the network of
obligations arising out of the employment relationship2 7
Deficiencies in the Separate Legal Entities Approach
The separate entities requirement is not, however, free from criticism. The imposition of an additional legal requirement fails to
conform with the underlying principles of dual capacity discussed

90. The issue of whether to apply a legal entities test or independent obligations test has
not be specifically decided. Neither Ohio nor California, the only states other than Illinois
that have accepted dual capacity, apply any entity requirement.
91. See notes 48 and 72 supra and accompanying text. In Smith, the defendant was a
corporate lessor and also a member of a joint venture. In Marcus, the defendant was a sole
proprietor and a partner in a partnership.
92. Kottis v. U.S. Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976). See Third Party Liability,
supra note 16, at 571-80, for a thorough discussion of the arguments in opposition to
employer-manufacturer dual capacity.
93. Kottis v. U.S. Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22, 26 (7th Cir. 1976).
94. Id.
95. Third Party Liability, supra note 16, at 571-72.
96. State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258, 260 (Alaska 1979): "It would be an enormous, and
perhaps illusory, task to draw a principled line of distinction between those situations in
which the employee could sue and those in which he could not."
97. Billy v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (1980).
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by the Illinois Supreme Court in Smith. 8 The court noted the unfairness of determining the employee's right to recovery upon the
fortuitous choice of a particular business organization. 9 Further,
the court embraced a case which involved only one legal entity as
an example of a proper application of the dual capacity doctrine.10 0
While the separate legal entities requirement does present courts
and litigants with concrete guidelines about dual capacity
claims° 1 it ignores the difference between duties and obligations
owed to an employee which arise out of the employment relationship and those which arise out of the employee's status as a member of the public. 10 2 The fact that a particular employee works for
only one entity or employer forecloses analysis of separate obligations of the employer, thus exalting form over substance. It is
doubtful that the states intended that workers' compensation statutes should immunize an employer from any and all liability for
the injuries of one who, by coincidence, happens to be an
employee. 0 3
Application of the separate entities requirement fails to discern
whether the injury stems from risks assumed by an employee as a
party to the workers' compensation compromise. The employee implicitly knows what risks inhere in the employment relationship. 1 4
The workers' compensation compromise envelopes those risks.'0 6
One of the purposes of the Act is to compensate only for losses
resulting from risks to an employee which are a result of working
in the industry. 0 6 When an employer makes a business decision to
use tools in its operations that it manufactures, or to employ workers on land that it also owns, and an employee received injuries,
those injuries stem from decisions and risks made by the employer

98. Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 77 Ill. 2d 313, 320, 396 N.E.2d 524, 528 (1979).
See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 319, 396 N.E.2d 527, citing Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
101. The focus of the analysis is on the particular form of the employer rather than a
more substantive analysis of duties and obligations.
102. Lewis v. Gardner Eng'r Corp., 254 Ark. 17, 21, 491 S.W.2d 778, 780 (1973)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 26, 491 S.W.2d at 783 (Fogleman, J., dissenting). Frequently, the tortfeasor's
capacity as the injured person's employer is merely coincidental. See Third Party Liability,
supra note 16, at 562.
104. Employer Suability, supra note 5, at 832.
105. Id.
106. Lewis v. Gardner Eng'r Corp., 254 Ark. 13, 17, 491 S.W.2d 778, 784 (1973)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting).
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in an extra-relational capacity.1 0 7 Neither the employment contract
nor the workers' compensation scheme necessitates the employer's
assumption of a second status in these situations. " 8
The legal entities approach also fails to incorporate fundamental
changes in tort law, such as strict product liability, into the workers' compensation compromise. 1 9 As the law changes to provide
the public greater protections against various hazards, under this
aproach the employee's rights remain stagnant. These developments upset the legislative balance in favor of the employer by according it greater protection than may have been originally anticipated. For instance, an injured person may not bring suit against a
manufacturer for strict products liability, simply because the manufacturer employes the injured party. 110 The employee is thereby
penalized by only partial restoration of the loss through workers'
compensation."' Yet, a manufacturer must account for the full loss
if his product injures a third person.
In addition, the separate entities approach transforms the deterrence element of workers' compensation benefits into a shield
against greater liability, which exists independent of the common
law defenses."' Unconditional application of the exclusive remedy
provision may result in ameliorating the effects of lawsuits against
an employer-third party tortfeasor for its negligent acts toward its
employees. Sloppy procedure in manufacturing, substandard practice of medicine, and careless upkeep of premises may thus go partially unpunished."'
RECOMMENDATIONS

The application of the dual capacity doctrine should be conditioned upon a complete analysis of facts, not upon legal formalities
which ignore the fundamental principles that initially gave rise to
the doctrine. The examination of separate legal persona as prescribed by the Illinois Supreme Court should also be undertaken
with the ameliorative goals of dual capacity in mind. The in-

107.
108.
109.
formed,
110.
(1977).
111.
112.
113.

Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 190, 378 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1978).
Third Party Liability, supra note 16, at 573.
New actions, not in existence when the workers' compensation compromise was
have developed to increase the liability of employers to third parties.
Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 803
Id. at 111, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
Id.
Employer Suability, supra note 5, at 832.
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dependant obligations approach of California and Ohio avoids the
harsh results that can occur with the unrestricted application of an
exclusive remedy provision. That approach also conforms to the
dual capacity rationale, as stated in Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, that the fortuitous circumstance of a particular business organization should not determine the liability that attaches
to an employer's actions." 4
In applying the dual capacity doctrine, courts should analyze the
particular obligations of an employer to his employee in the employment relationship."
If the employer has an additional legal
capacity from which separate and distinct obligations are owed to
the employee, the dual capacity exception should apply without
reservation." 6 Although identifying distinct obligations is not simple, several factors help to establish the existence of dual-capacity.
For example, the California courts have limited dual capacity in
employer-manufacturer cases to situations where the item causing
the employee's injury is primarily manufactured for sale to the
public and only incidentally used in the defendant's activities.,
Similarly, courts confronted with an employer-landowner fact situation can evaluate the reason for the employee's presence on the
land. If the employee is always present on the employer's land
while engaged in his duties, the duty to provide a safe place to
work is exclusively owed to the employee. Where an employer requires its employee to work on land owned or supervised by a third
party who has separate duties to the employee, the fact that the
employer coincidentally employed its worker on its own land
should not preclude recovery. Therefore, by evaluating the reasons
for the employee's presence on the land or use of a tool manufactured by the employer, the courts can more easily ascertain the
existence of separate, independent obligations. In this manner, the
duties owed can be traced to either the employment relationship or
to the employer's third party capacity.

114.
115.

See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
Comment, Manufacturer's Liability As A Dual Capacity Of An Employer, 12
AKRON L. REV. 747, 769 (1979).
116. But see, Employer Suability, supra note 5, at 833: "[Tihere will not be many situations where the employer occupies a separate capacity giving rise to distinct duties, and
admittedly, courts will have to make searching examinations of the facts peculiar to each
alleged dual capacity case." (footnote omitted).
117. Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 803
(1977).
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CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the previous rejection and confused application
of the dual capacity doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court has
clearly accepted the doctrine as a viable exception to the exclusive
remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act. It has, however, left many questions about the application of the doctrine unanswered. Whether to accept the legal entities approach or the independent obligations approach has proved to be an obstacle to
the application of dual capacity. The independent obligations approach, however, is more consistent with the dual capacity doctrine
and its utilization in Illinois. Restricting dual capacity analysis to
the presence of distinct legal entities fails to take cognizance of the
underlying rational of the doctrine.
Illinois should apply the dual capacity doctrine to its fullest extent in order to promote the continuing fundamental fairness of
the worker's compensation compromise. Adoption of the independent obligations approach by the Illinois Supreme Court would reduce uncertainty in the application of the dual capacity doctrine
for the lower state courts and potential litigants. The dual capacity
doctrine, with necessary clarifications, can constitute a viable use
of equitable principles, without encouraging frivolous actions
against employers.
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